


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USSR - NORTH VIETNAM: Podgorny will visit Hanoi  
next week.

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USSR - NORTH VIETNAM: SOVIET PRESIDENT PODGORNY  
WILL LEAD A DELEGATION TO HANOI NEXT WEEK.

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[REDACTED] THE SOVIET LEADER-  
SHIP HAS A BUSY SCHEDULE THIS MONTH, AND THERE MAY  
BE SOME SLIPPAGE IN THE TIMETABLE. NONETHELESS, A  
HIGH-LEVEL SOVIET VISIT TO NORTH VIETNAM IS ALMOST  
CERTAINLY IN THE CARDS.

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THE SOVIET DECISION TO RECEIVE PRESIDENT NIXON  
AFTER THE MINING OF NORTH VIETNAM'S PORTS DID NOT  
GO DOWN WELL IN HANOI, AND MOSCOW UNDOUBTEDLY SEES  
A NEED TO REASSURE THE NORTH VIETNAMESE. HANOI  
WILL WANT TO DISCUSS WAYS OF GETTING SUPPLIES THROUGH,  
AS WELL AS THE USSR'S LUKEWARM ENDORSEMENT OF ITS  
CURRENT OFFENSIVE. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE PROBABLY  
RESENT MOSCOW'S VEILED SKEPTICISM ABOUT HANOI'S PROS-  
PECTS IN THE CURRENT OFFENSIVE AND ITS REPEATED RE-  
PUBLIC STATEMENTS THAT NEGOTIATIONS ARE THE BEST  
WAY TO RESOLVE CONFLICTS.

UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE VISIT IS LIKELY  
TO BE DIFFICULT. THE SOVIETS WILL PROBABLY ATTEMPT  
TO REASSURE THE VIETNAMESE, BUT IN WAYS THAT WILL  
NOT UNDULY DISTURB THE US OR THE ATMOSPHERE GENERATED  
BY RECENT US-SOVIET TALKS. THE SOVIETS ARE LIKELY  
TO CITE THEIR EFFORTS TO SECURE CHINESE COOPERATION  
REGARDING SEA SHIPMENTS TO HANOI AS EVIDENCE THAT  
THE USSR HAS NOT ABANDONED THE VIETNAMESE, AND THEY  
WILL PROBABLY BE AMENABLE TO ANY NORTH VIETNAMESE  
SUGGESTIONS ON NEW APPROACHES TO THE CHINESE TO SE-  
CURE THEIR COOPERATION IN GETTING SOVIET SUPPLIES  
TO NORTH VIETNAM. AT THE SAME TIME, HOWEVER, THE  
SOVIETS ARE LIKELY TO REITERATE THEIR VIEW THAT  
NEGOTIATIONS OFFER THE VIETNAMESE AS MANY ADVANTAGES  
AS FIGHTING, AND THEY PROBABLY WILL URGE THE VIET-  
NAMESE TO EXPLORE THE LATEST US PEACE PROPOSALS.

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
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